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A B S T R A C T
When someone is watching you, you may change your behaviour in various ways: this is called the ‘audience
eﬀect’. Social behaviours such as acting prosocially or changing gaze patterns may be used as signals of re-
putation and thus may be particularly prone to audience eﬀects. The present paper aims to test the relationship
between prosocial choices, gaze patterns and the feeling of being watched within a novel ecologically valid
paradigm, where participants communicate with a video-clip of a confederate and believe she is (or is not) a live
feed of a confederate who can see them back. Results show that when participants believe they are watched, they
tend to make more prosocial choices and they gaze less to the confederate. We also ﬁnd that the increase in
prosocial behaviour when being watched correlates with social anxiety traits. Moreover, we show for the ﬁrst
time that prosocial choices inﬂuence subsequent gaze patterns of participants, although this is true for both live
and pre-recorded interactions. Overall, these ﬁndings suggest that the opportunity to signal a good reputation to
other people is a key modulator of prosocial decisions and eye gaze in live communicative contexts. They further
indicate that gaze should be considered as an interactive and dynamic signal.
1. Introduction
We naturally care about how other people judge us, that is, our
reputation. When our reputation is at stake, we change our behaviour in
order to maintain it, because this makes us appear likeable to others
(Emler, 1990; Tennie, Frith, & Frith, 2010). A subtle but recurrent
‘threat’ to our reputation is whether other people are watching us or
not. The present paper explores how the belief in being watched
modulates two behaviours that acquire a signalling function in the
presence of an observer: prosocial decisions (Bradley, Lawrence, &
Ferguson, 2018; Izuma, Matsumoto, Camerer, & Adolphs, 2011) and
eye gaze (Gobel, Kim, & Richardson, 2015; Laidlaw, Foulsham, Kuhn, &
Kingstone, 2011). We study these changes in a conversation context,
using a novel well-controlled experimental paradigm. For the ﬁrst time
we also examine the relationship between gaze of participants and their
prosocial choices, and propose that this relationship can help identi-
fying which social cognitive processes modulate gaze behaviour in live
versus pre-recorded interactions. In the following, we brieﬂy review
studies of how people respond when being watched in a variety of
contexts.
1.1. Reputation management and being watched
Theories about how people change their behaviour in the presence
of other people were ﬁrst introduced by Triplett in 1898, when he
discovered that cyclists were faster when competing against each other
than against a clock (Triplett, 1898). He stated that the ‘bodily presence
of another’ caused a change in the behaviour of participants, making
them more competitive when racing. It is important here to distinguish
between ‘social facilitation’ (Zajonc, 1965), which is an enhancement of
performance in the presence of any conspeciﬁc (who may or may not be
looking), and the ‘audience eﬀect’, which is a change in behaviour
speciﬁcally caused by the belief that someone else is watching me. Here
we focus on the latter.
An increasing number of studies suggest that the audience eﬀect can
best be understood in terms of reputation management (Emler, 1990;
Resnick, Zeckhauser, Swanson, & Lockwood, 2006; Tennie et al., 2010).
Reputation is a social construct that emerges from how we think others
see us, and is changeable over time depending on our actions (Cage,
2015; Izuma, 2012). For instance, acting for the beneﬁt of other people
and conforming to social norms are two examples of how individuals
can signal their good reputation to gain approval of others. The main-
tenance or management of reputation requires individuals to infer what
others think of them, care about how they are seen, and have the desire
to be viewed positively (Cage, 2015; Izuma, 2012). This means that
reputation management requires both mentalizing and social motiva-
tion (Cage, 2015; Izuma, 2012; Izuma, Saito, & Sadato, 2010; Tennie
et al., 2010). This is supported by neuroimaging studies showing that
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brain regions involved in these two cognitive processes are activated
during diﬀerent phases of reputation management. For instance, the
medial prefrontal cortex (a neural correlate for mentalizing; Frith &
Frith, 2006) is activated when processing one's reputation in the eyes of
other people (Izuma, 2012; Izuma et al., 2010). Moreover, a region
involved in motivation and reward processing, the ventral striatum, is
engaged when participants anticipate positive reputation after pre-
senting themselves in front of others (Izuma, 2012; Izuma et al., 2010;
Izuma, Saito, & Sadato, 2009).
When people are observed by others, one way to signal their re-
putation is by behaving in a more prosocial fashion (Bradley et al.,
2018; Smith & Bird, 2000). Several real-life studies have shown that the
possibility of gaining reputation in front of others is a key factor to
increase prosocial behaviour (e.g. Bereczkei, Birkas, & Kerekes, 2007;
Raihani & Smith, 2015; Soetevent, 2005). Lab-based studies, which
allow for more experimental control, also show similar results. For in-
stance, Satow (1975) used a single-trial task and found that in the
presence of an experimenter participants donate more money to a re-
search fund than in its absence. Other studies have used economic
games, which facilitate reputation building between subjects in the
game by having more trial repetitions than single-trial tasks (Bradley
et al., 2018; Pfeiﬀer & Nowak, 2006). Using the Public Goods game,
Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2014) showed that being watched by another
participant increases the amount of eﬀort exerted to contribute to
public, but not private, goods. In another study Izuma and colleagues
used the Dictator game (Izuma et al., 2011): on each trial participants
were given a speciﬁc amount of money and had to decide whether to
give some of this money to someone else (e.g. charity; prosocial be-
haviour) or keep it all for themselves (non-prosocial behaviour). They
found that participants donated money more often while monitored by
a confederate than when alone in a room, which can be interpreted as
reputation management. Cage and colleagues (Cage, Pellicano, Shah, &
Bird, 2013) replicated this ﬁnding and also found that, when the re-
cipient was an individual (not a charity) who could later reciprocate to
the participant, the number of donations was higher in the presence
than in the absence of an observer. These studies are clear examples of
participants manipulating the information they signal to other people in
order to maintain good reputation.
These studies have two main limitations. On the one hand, the
control and test conditions are not optimally matched to strictly isolate
eﬀects of the belief in being watched: they compare a control condition
where the participant is alone in the room, versus a test condition
where an observer is present in the room or in a video-feed (see Izuma
et al., 2010, 2009 for examples of studies with a video-feed). Instead,
control and test conditions that are both social would be more suitable
to test true audience eﬀects. The present paper uses more closely
matched experimental conditions that vary only in the belief in being
seen, to understand how a belief manipulation alone (without any
changes in the presence of the confederate) aﬀects reputation man-
agement. On the other hand, although prosocial behaviour has been
traditionally measured by economic games, such as the Public Goods or
Dictator games, concerns have been raised about their external validity
(Galizzi & Navarro-Martinez, 2017; Winking & Mizer, 2013). Thus, in
the present study we compare how the belief in being watched mod-
ulates prosocial behaviour in the Dictator game and in a novel task
where participants disclose their prosocial tendencies in everyday life
situations.
1.2. Gaze behaviour and being watched
Our eyes have a dual function in social interactions: they gather
information from the world, but also send signals to other people
(Gobel et al., 2015; Risko, Richardson, & Kingstone, 2016). For in-
stance, direct gaze signals a desire to communicate (Ho, Foulsham, &
Kingstone, 2015; Kendon, 1967), it monitors facial displays of the other
person to ensure mutual understanding (Kleinke, 1986), it expresses
aﬃliation or (dis)agreement (Kendrick & Holler, 2017), attractiveness
(Georgescu et al., 2013), and threat or dominance (Emery, 2000; Gobel
et al., 2015). Conversely, averted gaze has been linked to preference for
no interaction (Foulsham, Walker, & Kingstone, 2011), conformity with
social or cultural norms (Gobel, Chen, & Richardson, 2017; Gobel et al.,
2015; Laidlaw et al., 2011; also known as ‘civil inattention’, Goﬀman,
1963), and fear or submissive behaviour (Emery, 2000; Gobel et al.,
2015). The variety of social meanings that our eyes can convey makes
our gaze a powerful tool for social interactions.
Although the dual function model of eye gaze was ﬁrst introduced in
the 70s (Argyle & Cook, 1976), many studies have ignored it. In tra-
ditional experimental settings, participants see pictures or videos of a
person while their gaze or other actions are recorded (see Risko,
Laidlaw, Freeth, Foulsham, & Kingstone, 2012 for a review), but they
are fully aware that the pictures or videos cannot see back. Thus, par-
ticipants are not signalling anything to the person in the stimulus be-
cause it makes no sense to communicate with a picture unable to per-
ceive them. These traditional approaches allow good experimental
control but are not interactive (Gobel et al., 2015; Schilbach et al.,
2013), and it is increasingly recognised that understanding the cogni-
tive mechanisms of social behaviour will require more than just one-
way picture stimuli.
A few recent studies have examined how people's gaze behaviour
changes when they believe they are being watched, that is, when gaze
acquires a signalling function. For instance, Laidlaw et al. (2011)
measured the looking behaviour of participants with eye-tracking as
they were sitting in a waiting room, either in a presence of a con-
federate or in the presence of a video-clip of the same confederate. It
was found that participants tended to look at the confederate in the
video-clip, but seldom looked at the live confederate. In another study,
Gobel and colleagues (Gobel et al., 2015) used eye-tracking to explore
how participants changed gaze patterns when they believed they would
later be viewed by another person. Participants watched video-clips of
high and low rank people while their face was recorded. Results showed
that, if participants believed the person in the video would later see the
recordings, they made more eye contact with the low rank model, and
less with the high rank model. In these studies, the authors suggest that
averted gaze in live (versus pre-recorded) settings signals the activation
of previously acquired social norms, by which it is not polite to stare at
someone (Gobel et al., 2017). The eﬀect of these social norms translates
into active gaze disengagement because participants do not want to
appear as either someone impolite or as an interaction partner to the
stranger (Foulsham et al., 2011).
There is a main limitation to these previous studies: participants
believe they are interacting with a stranger with whom they are not
supposed to talk to, that is, there is no communicative exchange be-
tween them. These results may not generalise to all social contexts. For
instance, it has recently been shown that it is the potential for social
interaction, rather than online social presence, which modulates eye
gaze in video-conference contexts (Gregory & Antolin, 2018). Mansour
and Kuhn (2019) have also shown that when participants are required
to actively engage with the confederate, they direct more gaze to the
eyes of the confederate in the live video-call than in the pre-recorded
video-call. Thus, communicative (e.g. conversation) and non-commu-
nicative environments may engage a series of cognitive processes that
modulate diﬀerently the amount of gaze directed to a live person. In the
present study, we test if gaze signalling patterns change between a live
and pre-recorded setting in the context of a question-answer task,
where it is clear that participant and confederate should communicate.
1.3. Relationship between prosocial and gaze behaviour
In communicative situations we send information through eye gaze,
but also through speech, facial expressions and gestures. To further
understand the meaning of gaze patterns, it is useful to consider gaze in
relation to other events in the communicative exchange: this can help
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identifying which cognitive mechanisms modulate eye gaze in live in-
teractions. Previous studies on eye gaze have found that eye contact
elicits more prosocial behaviour (Bull & Gibson-Robinson, 1981) and
that we engage in mutual gaze to seek approval from others (Efran,
1968; Efran & Broughton, 1966). However, we are not aware of pre-
vious studies examining temporal relationships between gaze patterns
and prosocial behaviour. Thus, a core question of the present paper is to
see if and how these behaviours are related. We can draw out at least
two plausible hypotheses.
First, we can consider how gaze patterns before a prosocial decision
relate to what decision is made. For example, if two people share mu-
tual gaze, this may increase their prosocial behaviour (see Bull &
Gibson-Robinson, 1981 for an example). Similarly, gaze to another
person can be an indicator of how much you are interested in that
person or care about them, which might predict later prosocial re-
sponses to that person. In this case, a relationship between gaze pat-
terns before making a choice and a prosocial choice itself would in-
dicate that social attention inﬂuences prosocial choices (social attention
hypothesis). This could occur regardless of whether the participant is
interacting with a video or another person.
Second, we can consider how making a prosocial or antisocial de-
cision changes gaze patterns after this decision. For example, after
making a donation to a charity someone may look to others to receive
their approval or to seek more information about what they think
(Efran, 1968; Efran & Broughton, 1966; Kleinke, 1986). Building on this
idea, we suggest that if there is a relationship where choices predict
later gaze patterns, this might indicate that participants are engaged in
a process of reputation management (reputation management hypoth-
esis). However, this should only occur if people believe they are en-
gaged in a live interaction with a real person.
Thus, the relationship between gaze patterns and prosocial choices
can help us understand some of the underlying cognitive processes
which drive these behaviours, and show if either social attention or
reputation management are important in these contexts.
1.4. The present study
The present study aims to gain a better understanding of how the
belief in being watched modulates prosocial and gaze behaviours as
signals to maintain a good reputation. Our speciﬁc aims are the fol-
lowing. First, to compare whether two diﬀerent types of prosocial be-
haviour that can signal good reputation - monetary donations and
disclosure of prosocial tendencies - show similar changes between a live
and pre-recorded interaction. Economic games have been recently re-
ported to have poor external validity (Galizzi & Navarro-Martinez,
2017; Winking & Mizer, 2013), so it is helpful to know whether changes
in monetary donations and changes in disclosure of prosocial tenden-
cies are consistent. Second, to examine the signalling function of eye
gaze (between a live and pre-recorded interaction) when participant
and confederate are in a communicative situation. This will clarify
whether results from previous studies using non-communicative con-
texts (Gobel et al., 2015; Laidlaw et al., 2011) generalise to other social
contexts. Finally, we aim to study for the ﬁrst time the relationship
between prosocial behaviour and eye gaze. This can help us understand
which cognitive processes - social attention or reputation management -
drive these behaviours.
To do this, we designed a deceptive video-conference interface that
participants would use to complete the study. This novel experimental
paradigm allows for well-matched control and test conditions but at the
same time preserves enough ecological validity (see Mansour & Kuhn,
2019 for a recent paper using a similar paradigm), which ensures that
changes in behaviour are true audience eﬀects. The main desktop of the
interface showed three diﬀerent boxes: the Video box, where the video-
feed was presented, the Question box, where the questions appeared,
and the Answer box, where the options for the answer were shown (see
Fig. 1a). In our deceptive manipulation we used the same video-clips of
two confederates across two settings: one where participants believed
the video-feed was real (online setting; ON), and one where they were
told the videos were pre-recorded (oﬄine setting; OFF). This ensured
high ecological validity for the ON setting and, at the same time, the use
of well-matched stimuli across ON and OFF settings. Participants be-
lieved the two confederates were students volunteering in a charity.
In our within-subject design, participants completed two tasks
measuring prosocial behaviour. Participants played the Dictator game
used by Izuma et al. (2011), where we measured the frequency of ac-
cepted donations (Oﬀer task). Although prosocial behaviour has been
traditionally measured by economic games, such as the Dictator game,
concerns have been raised about their external validity (Galizzi &
Navarro-Martinez, 2017). For this reason, we also used a novel Story
task inspired by Izuma et al. (2010), where participants disclose their
prosocial tendencies in everyday life situations. During the task, we
ensured a communicative environment by 1) having videos where the
confederate read the questions to the participant, and 2) telling parti-
cipants to say their choice aloud before entering it in the computer.
Based on previous evidence (Cage et al., 2013; Izuma et al., 2011), we
hypothesized that the belief in being watched would increase prosocial
behaviour of participants across both tasks, because it signals good
reputation to the observer.
During the tasks, participants' eye gaze was recorded with eye-
tracking, and we measured the looking time to the three boxes on the
screen – the Video box, the Question box, and the Answer box. We can
contrast two possible hypotheses for gaze behaviour. If in our com-
municative context participants need to gain or signal useful informa-
tion from/to the live confederate, then they might look more to the
Video box under the ON setting compared to OFF setting. However, if
participants still conform to a social norm of avoiding staring, we may
replicate the results of Gobel et al. (2015) and Laidlaw et al. (2011),
and ﬁnd more gaze to the Video box under the OFF setting.
A core question in this study concerns the relationship between
prosocial choices and gaze directed at the confederate (Video box) on a
trial-by-trial basis. The presence and direction of this relationship
across diﬀerent time windows can help identifying which social cog-
nitive processes modulate gaze behaviour (see Fig. 1b). As introduced
earlier, we will test if gaze before the choice predicts the later choice
behaviour (social attention hypothesis), and if the choice predicts gaze
behaviour during the post-answer phase (reputation management hy-
pothesis). Importantly, we expect that the social attention hypothesis
will be true for both settings, while the reputation management hy-
pothesis will only happen in the ON setting.
After the tasks, participants ﬁlled a questionnaire about their per-
ception of the confederates in each setting, and a questionnaire mea-
suring their social anxiety traits. People with social anxiety fear or
perceive negatively other people, and they show increased concern to
gain social approval (Cremers & Roelofs, 2016; Morrison & Heimberg,
2013). A meta-analysis by Uziel (2007) shows that negative personality
traits (e.g. low self-esteem, neuroticism or introversion, which are as-
sociated with social anxiety) are strong predictors of how social pre-
sence will aﬀect individual performance. In line with this, Satow (1975)
found that, when answers were public, people in high need for social
approval (i.e. those who score high in the Social Desirability Scale;
Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) donated more money than people in low
need for social approval. This indicates that people with social anxiety
traits might be more susceptible to audience eﬀects. Here, we perform
an exploratory analysis of the relationship between social anxiety traits
and audience eﬀects.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Participants
We aimed for a sample of 32 participants (8 for each condition).
Overall, a group of 43 adults (25 females, 18 males; mean age:
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23.95 ± 3.59) were recruited because, as we were testing, 9 partici-
pants did not believe the deceptive manipulation for the online setting,
and 2 participants had poor-quality eye-tracking data. Thus, the ﬁnal
valid sample consisted of a group of 32 adults (20 females, 12 males;
mean age: 23.41 ± 3.55). All participants gave written informed
consent before doing the experiment and were compensated £8 for their
time and travel expenses; they were aware that they could receive a
bonus of maximum £4 depending on their performance during the Oﬀer
task (see Section 2.5 for details on the Oﬀer task bonus). The study was
granted ethical approval by the local Research Ethics Committee, and
was in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
2.2. Cover story
In order to manipulate the beliefs of participants in an eﬃcient and
credible way, participants were told that we were investigating social
attention during charitable behaviour, and that they would complete a
task with two student volunteers working in a charity (confederates).
Participants were given an information sheet about the aims and work
of the charity. Although the name of the charity was not real (Mental
Health Awareness Foundation), the description was very similar to that
of the real charity Mental Health Foundation and money collected
during the task was donated to the latter.
Participants were told that we would connect online with the two
confederates at the charity using “an interface similar to Skype but for
experimental research” that we called “LINK: peer-to-peer experi-
ments”. The experimenter pretended to launch LINK through MATLAB.
However, the screens shown during the task were designed with
MATLAB (R2016b, MathWorks) and Cogent Graphics in a way that
tried to escape from the typical experimental layout. The LINK main
desktop would show a banner on the top with the LINK logo, a box
called Current Call (where the video call would appear; Video box in
the analyses), a Screen Share box (both the participant and the con-
federate were supposed to see this box; the questions and chosen an-
swers were displayed here; Question box in the analyses), and the
Response Options box (where the participant could see the option to
answer the question; Answer box in the analyses) (see Fig. 1a). Parti-
cipants were also told in the beginning that, in case the students in the
charity (confederates) were not available, a set of videos recorded
during the piloting of the study would be used instead.
Fig. 1. a) Main desktop of the fake video-conference interface “LINK”. b) Screenshots of the time windows for each dilemma/trial of the Story task, and model
describing potential relationships between gaze and prosocial choices across the diﬀerent time windows.
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2.3. Counterbalancing conditions
There were four diﬀerent conditions, in which we counterbalanced
the order of the settings (online=ON, oﬄine=OFF), the confederate
linked to each setting and session (confederate 1, confederate 2), and
the story linked to each setting and session (story 1, story 2) (see S1 for
a table with all counterbalancing conditions). Each participant was
allocated to one condition: they completed the Story and Oﬀer tasks
twice, one for each setting.
2.4. Story task
In order to test how the audience eﬀect changes reputation man-
agement, we designed a task inspired by Izuma et al. (2010), where
participants have to disclose their tendencies relative to social norms.
We created a set of 2 stories that depicted real day-to-day situations
emulating a moral dilemma. These moral dilemmas were part of a
larger pool of dilemmas that we created and piloted through an online
form on 23 adults. In each story, there were 5 diﬀerent dilemmas (i.e. 5
trials) with two options: one option was prosocial but had a temporal or
monetary cost (e.g. volunteer for an afternoon, give money to a
homeless person), whereas the other option was non-prosocial and had
no cost (see S2 for full stories). Both stories had an additional neutral
trial where both options were non-prosocial.
For each trial, the confederate in the video read a statement de-
scribing the dilemma and asked participants ‘What do you do?’.
Participants could also read the statement on the Screen Share. The two
possible answers were displayed on each end of a continuous scale in
the Response Options box, and participants indicated with the mouse
how likely they were to do one or the other option (halfway the line was
a neutral answer). Participants were instructed to say their choice aloud
to the confederate before clicking the mouse, in order to create a
communicative environment. The choice was displayed on the Screen
Share for 3 s, and the confederate in the video stayed in silence as if she
was checking the choice. In between trials a ﬁxation cross was dis-
played on the Screen Share for 1 s, and a blurred frame of the video-clip
plus the message ‘Connection paused' were displayed on the Current
Call box (see Fig. 1b for screenshots of each time window and S3 for a
sample trial).
2.5. Oﬀer task
As a second measure of the audience eﬀect, we used a variation of
the Dictator game previously used by Izuma et al. (2011) and Cage et al.
(2013). We used a modiﬁed version of the payoﬀ matrix used by Cage
et al. (2013), in which we reduced the amounts at play to adapt them to
our participation fee (see Fig. 2a). Each cell in the payoﬀ matrix cor-
responds to one trial, which was tested once for each setting (ON, OFF);
within each setting, the 25 trials were randomized. To avoid partici-
pants memorizing their choices, we applied a jittering on the amounts
of money by adding a random number from a normal distribution N
(0,0.2). If the original amount was 0, no jittering was applied; if the
amounts the participant would give and the charity would gain were
equal, the jittering was the same for both amounts. The trials in which
the participant would give £0 and the charity would gain £0 were re-
moved from the analyses since the choices would be random.
For each oﬀer, the confederate in the video asked to the participant
‘would you accept or reject this oﬀer?’, and both the question and the
monetary oﬀer were displayed on the Screen Share. The two possible
answers (‘accept’ and ‘reject’) were displayed on the Response Options
box, and the side where they appeared was counterbalanced across
trials. To select an option, participants had to press a blue key (‘D’ or
‘K’) that matched the position of the chosen option. Participants were
instructed to say the answer aloud to the confederate before pressing
the key. After the key press, the answer was displayed on the Screen
Share for 3 s, during which the confederate in the video stayed in
silence as if she was looking at the answer. In between trials, a ﬁxation
cross was displayed on the Screen Share for 1 s, while a blurred frame of
the video-clip plus the words ‘Connection paused’ were displayed on
the Current Call box (see Fig. 2b for screenshots of each time window).
Importantly, in the beginning participants were told that, on top of
the ﬁxed payment of £8, they would receive a bonus of maximum £4
depending on their choices in the Oﬀer task. They were told that in the
end of the experiment a random trial would be selected: if in that trial
participants had accepted the oﬀer, they would give that amount to the
charity and keep the rest; conversely, if they had rejected the oﬀer, they
would keep the full £4 bonus.
2.6. Stimuli: video-clips
We recorded 3 sets of video-clips for each of the two confederates:
Alice and Sophie. During the ﬁlming session, the confederate went
through the two tasks and was recorded with a webcam on top of a
monitor, in order to simulate an online connection. The ﬁrst set of
video-clips was composed of 2 diﬀerent videos where the confederate
was pretending to have a conversation with someone else, although
only her part of the dialogue was recorded: in the ﬁrst conversation she
was greeting the participant and experimenter, testing that the Screen
Share worked, and receiving the instructions for the Story and Oﬀer
tasks; in the second conversation she said goodbye to the participant
and experimenter. The second set of video-clips was composed of 6
short videos for the Story task (one for each trial): for each video-clip,
the confederate would ﬁrst look at the screen and read a statement,
then look at the camera and ask a question, and ﬁnally look at her
screen again for 10 s. The third set of video-clips was composed of 25
short videos for the Oﬀer task (one for each trial). For each video clip,
the confederate would ﬁrst look at her screen for 1–2 s, then look at the
camera and ask the question, and ﬁnally look back to her screen for
10 s.
2.7. General procedure: deceptive video-conference paradigm
As an example, below we present the procedure for conditions 1 and
2, where participants complete the tasks under the ON setting and then
under the OFF setting (Fig. 3).
Once the participant had read the information about the charity and
practised the two tasks without video-clips, the eye-tracker was cali-
brated. The experimenter also pretended to check the webcam was
working by launching the ‘Webcam video’ on Movie Maker and leaving
it open, so the green light on the webcam would indicate it was swit-
ched on. The experimenter loaded LINK and explained to the partici-
pant the meaning of the boxes on the LINK main desktop. Following the
instructions on the Current Call box, the experimenter would then
connect to the charity.
For the ON setting, the connection was successful and the video of
the confederate (Alice) was played. Although the video was pre-re-
corded, the experimenter pretended to have a conversation with Alice
and she had previously rehearsed its timing to ensure credibility.
During the conversation, the experimenter introduced Alice to the
participant and pretended to run a test with Alice to check the Screen
Share was working, thereby enhancing the belief that Alice was real and
could see the information shown on the Screen Share. The experimenter
then gave some instructions for the Story task to both Alice and the
participant, explicitly telling Alice ‘don't make any facial expression or
say anything that could inﬂuence the participant's choices’, so that the
participant would not suspect of Alice being too unresponsive (see S4
for the full conversation). The experimenter left the testing room and
waited outside until the participant announced the task was completed.
Then the experimenter loaded the Oﬀer task and gave instructions to
both Alice and the participant, and left the testing room again until the
participant announced the task was completed. Then, a short video of
Alice saying goodbye was played. In between settings, the eye-tracker
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was calibrated again to make sure the data was recorded properly for
the OFF setting.
For the OFF setting, the connection would fail, automatically try to
connect again, and fail again. Three options were displayed on the
Current Call box: try the connection again, use the oﬄine mode with
stored videos, or exit. During this time, the experimenter pretended to
get concerned about the connection and to send a text to the second
confederate (Sophie). Shortly after, she pretended that Sophie had an-
swered back saying that she was in a meeting that was taking longer
than expected. At this point the experimenter told participants to use
the pre-recorded videos: she would remove the webcam and load the
oﬄine mode of LINK. The LINK layout would change slightly: now the
Current Call box was called Videos, and the Shared Screen was called
Side Screen. Participants completed the tasks after receiving the cor-
responding instructions.
2.8. Post-test questionnaire and debrieﬁng
After completing the two tasks under the two settings, all partici-
pants completed a post-test questionnaire that had 3 sections. In the
ﬁrst section, participants had to indicate on a scale from 0 (disagree) to
8 (agree) to what extent they agreed with some statements. These
statements were related to their perception of the two models (e.g. ‘I
liked Alice very much’) and the interaction with them (e.g. ‘I think the
interaction with Alice was very natural’), and their perception of the
relevance of the charity and charitable behaviour in their life (e.g. ‘I
think it is very important to donate money to a charity’). In the second
section, participants were asked some questions to check they did not
realise the real purpose of the experiment and to know about their
strategies to give an answer. Finally, in the third section participants
completed the Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS; Liebowitz, 1987).
It consists of 24 questions assessing social anxiety and phobia across
diﬀerent real life situations. The overall score can range from 0 (low
social anxiety) to 144 (high social anxiety), with scores over 65 re-
ﬂecting marked/severe social phobia. See S5 for the full post-test
questionnaire.
After participants completed the post-test questionnaires, the
experimenter ran the code to select the random trial that would de-
termine how much participants kept from the £4 bonus. If participants
were meant to give part of the bonus to the charity, they would place
the corresponding amount in a collection box. Once the data collection
was completed, the experimenter added up all the monetary amounts
that participants had given and made a donation to the Mental Health
Foundation. Finally, the experimenter asked whether they noticed that
the confederate in the ON setting was a pre-recorded video, and sub-
sequently debriefed participants about the manipulation, the real pur-
pose of the experiment and the real name of the charity. The overall
duration of the experiment was around 40min.
2.9. Eye-tracking
An Eye Tribe ET1000 eye-tracker (IT University of Copenhagen,
Denmark) was positioned at the base of a 19″ monitor. Participants sat
approximately 50 cm from the screen, and placed their head on a
homemade chin rest ﬁxed on the table. They went through a 9-point
calibration routine that took between 1 and 2min; they completed the
calibration twice, once before each setting was loaded. The eye-tracker
recorded the eye movements of both eyes at a rate of 30 Hz.
Three time windows and 3 regions of interest (ROIs) were deﬁned.
The 3 time windows corresponded to 1) the period of time where the
confederate asked the question (‘question’; around 10 s), 2) the period
of time before clicking the mouse, where participants were thinking
about the answer and saying it aloud (‘pre-answer’; unlimited) and 3)
the period of time after participants clicked the mouse, during which
the answer was displayed on the Screen Share (‘post-answer’; 3 s). The
ROIs corresponded to 1) the Video box, 2) the Question box and 3) the
Answer box (see Fig. 1a). To measure eye gaze, we computed the
proportion of looking time, which corresponds to the amount of time
that participants spent looking at each ROI (video box, question box
and answer box) relative to the total duration of each time window
(question, pre-answer, post-answer).
Fig. 2. a) Payoﬀ matrix. b) Screenshots of the time windows for each oﬀer/trial of the Oﬀer task.
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2.10. Data analyses
To check that the deceptive manipulation changed how the con-
federate was perceived by the participant, two-tailed paired t-tests be-
tween ON and OFF setting were computed for each of the traits rated in
the post-test questionnaire: likeability, naturalness and reciprocity.
For prosocial behaviour, we compared choices under the ON setting
to those under the OFF setting, taking also into account the order in
which the two settings appeared. For the Story task, the prosocial op-
tion was matched to 1 and the non-prosocial option to 0, and we
measured the percentage of prosociality of the choices. For the Oﬀer
task, the number of trials in which participants accepted to donate
money to the charity was computed (range: from 0 to 24 trials). A 2-
way repeated measures ANOVA with Setting (ON and OFF) as within-
subject factor, Order of setting (ﬁrst or second) as between-subject
factor, and dependent variable Choice was performed for each task.
Post-hoc pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni's adjustment were also
computed. Moreover, Pearson correlations were computed to assess the
relationship between prosocial behaviour and social anxiety scores: we
tested whether a greater diﬀerence in prosocial choices between ON
and OFF settings correlated with higher social anxiety traits.
For the eye-tracking measures, we tested the eﬀect of the setting
(ON, OFF) on the proportion of looking time to the Video box, Question
box and Answer box in the three time windows (question, pre-answer,
post-answer). Data for the three regions is not independent because
participants can only look at one place at a time. Therefore, we
analysed gaze to the three regions separately, using a two-way repeated
measures ANOVA with Setting and Time window as within-subject
factors for each task. Where sphericity could not be assumed, corrected
p-values using the Huynh-Feldt estimate were used. Post-hoc pairwise
comparisons using Bonferroni's adjustment were also computed. Here
we did not test correlations with social anxiety traits, because they
would be underpowered to correct for multiple comparisons when all
possible combinations between time windows and boxes on the screen
were taken into account.
A critical question concerns the relationship between gaze and
prosocial behaviour on a trial-by-trial basis. We used diﬀerent models
to test our two hypotheses on this relationship (social attention hy-
pothesis and reputation management hypothesis). First, we tested
whether choice was predicted by the belief in being seen and gaze
behaviour prior to giving an answer. We ﬁtted a mixed ANOVA with
Setting and Gaze (% looking time to Video box during question phase)
as independent variables, Participant as random factor, and Choice as
dependent variable. For the Story task we included 320 trials (32 par-
ticipants, 2 settings, 5 social trials), and for the Oﬀer task we included
1536 trials (32 participants, 2 settings, 24 oﬀers). Second, we tested
whether gaze behaviour after giving an answer was predicted by choice
and belief in being seen: we ﬁtted a mixed ANOVA with Setting and
Choice as independent variables, Participant as random factor, and
Gaze (% looking time to Video box during post-answer phase) as de-
pendent variable.
Since data was not normally distributed for all measures, we
Fig. 3. Overview of the procedure for each participant.
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performed a bootstrap analysis with 10,000 permutation tests for each
of the analyses, and examined the probability that the results could
have arisen by chance, given the distribution of our existing data. The
pattern of results for the bootstrap analysis (i.e. results above or below
p < .05) was identical to the classical ANOVA analyses, so we report
only the classic ANOVAs.
3. Results
3.1. Manipulation check: post-test questionnaire ratings
In the post-test questionnaire, participants rated the ON and OFF
confederate on three traits: likeability, naturalness and reciprocity.
Two-tailed paired t-tests between ON and OFF setting were computed
for each trait. Results showed that under the ON setting the confederate
was perceived as signiﬁcantly more likeable, t(31)= 2.31, p < .05,
dz= 0.408, and natural, t(31)= 2.14, p < .05, dz= 0.378, and tended
to be perceived as more reciprocal t(31)= 1.72, p= .096, dz= 0.304
(Fig. 4a). See Table 1 for descriptives (mean and SD) on post-test
questionnaire ratings.
3.2. Prosocial measures
To analyse prosocial measures, we ﬁtted a 2-way repeated measures
ANOVA for each task, with Setting (ON and OFF) as within-subject
factor and Order of setting (ﬁrst or second) as between-subject factor.
For the Story task, results showed a marginally signiﬁcant eﬀect of
Setting on prosocial choices, F(1,30)= 4.16, p= .05, np2= 0.122
(Fig. 4b): choices were more prosocial under the ON setting
(M=0.576, SD=0.174) than under the OFF setting (M=0.526,
SD=0.215). There was no main eﬀect of Order nor interaction be-
tween Setting and Order.
For the Oﬀer task, there was a tendency to accept more oﬀers under
the ON setting (M=15.1, SD=4.49) than OFF setting (M=14.3,
SD=5.07), F(1,30)= 3.43, p= .074, np2= 0.103 (Fig. 4c). There was
no main eﬀect of Order, but we found a tendency for an interaction
between Setting and Order, F(1,30)= 2.92, p= .098, np2= 0.089:
participants who performed the task ﬁrst under the ON setting and then
under the OFF setting showed no change in prosocial behaviour,
whereas in the reversed order prosocial behaviour was lower in the OFF
than in the ON setting.
Regarding social anxiety scores, we found a signiﬁcant positive
correlation between the change in prosocial behaviour (ON – OFF) and
Fig. 4. a) Post-test questionnaire ratings about the confederates: mean (ﬁlled circle), SE (error bars), and frequency of values (width of distribution). b) Percentage of
prosociality of choices in Story task. c) Number of accepted oﬀers in the Oﬀer task. d) Correlation between prosocial behaviour and social anxiety traits in Story task.
Asterisks signify diﬀerence at p < .05 (*), p < .01 (**) and p < .001 (***).
Table 1
Descriptives for post-test questionnaire ratings.
Rating Setting M SD
Likeable ON 5.62 1.54
OFF 5.03 1.77
Natural ON 5.66 1.64
OFF 4.84 2.08
Reciprocal ON 4.25 2.00
OFF 3.75 1.95
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social anxiety traits for the Story task, r=0.459, p < .01: the more
participants changed their behaviour from OFF to ON setting, the more
anxiety traits they had (Fig. 4d). There was no signiﬁcant correlation
between social anxiety traits and change in prosocial behaviour for the
Oﬀer task, r=0.225, p > .05.
3.3. Eye gaze: story task
For eye gaze, we ﬁtted a two-way repeated measures ANOVA for
each box (Video, Question, Answer), with Setting (ON and OFF) and
Time window (question, pre-answer, post-answer) as within-subject
factors. See Table 2 for descriptives (mean and SD) on the proportion of
looking time to each box and time window. Only signiﬁcant main ef-
fects and interactions are reported in the text; full results and post-hoc
tests are given in Supplementary materials (Table S6.1).
For looking time to the Video box, there was a main eﬀect of Time
window, F(2,62)= 38.5, p < .001, np2= 0.554, and a tendency for an
interaction eﬀect between Setting and Time window, F(2,62)= 3.6,
p= .054, np2= 0.104. Participants looked more to the Video box
during the question and post-answer phases, especially in the OFF
setting (Fig. 5a,d).
For looking time to the Question box, there was a main eﬀect of
Time window, F(2,62)= 437.1, p < .001, np2= 0.934, and an inter-
action eﬀect between Setting and Time window F(2,62)= 5.81,
p < .01, np2= 0.158. Participants looked more to the Question box in
the question and post-answer phases, especially in the ON setting
(Fig. 5b,d).
For looking time to the Answer box, there was a main eﬀect of
Setting, F(1,31)= 5.17, p < .05, np2= 0.143, and a main eﬀect of
Time window, F(2,62)= 710.1, p < .001, np2= 0.958, but no inter-
action eﬀect between these two factors. Participants looked more to the
Answer box in the pre-answer phase and in the ON setting (Fig. 5c,d).
Overall, these results are consistent with gaze shifting between the
diﬀerent windows as the task progresses, with less gaze towards the
Video box and more towards the Question or Answer boxes in the ON
setting, when participants believe the confederate can see them.
3.4. Eye gaze: oﬀer task
For eye gaze, we ﬁtted a two-way repeated measures ANOVA for
each box (Video, Question, Answer), with Setting (ON and OFF) and
Time window (question, pre-answer, post-answer) as within-subject
factors. See Table 3 for descriptives (mean and SD) on the proportion of
looking time to each box and time window. Full results are reported in
Supplementary Materials (Table S6.2) and signiﬁcant main eﬀects and
interactions are described below.
For the Video box, there was a main eﬀect of Setting, F
(1,31)= 13.5, p < .01, np2= 0.303, so that participants tended to
look more to the Video box under the OFF setting compared to the ON
setting. There was also main eﬀect of Time window, F(2,62)= 37.0,
p < .001, np2= 0.544, and an interaction eﬀect between Setting and
Time window F(2,62)= 8.0, p < .01, np2= 0.205: participants looked
more to the Video box during the question and post-answer phases,
especially in the OFF setting (Fig. 6a,d).
For the Question box, there was a main eﬀect of Setting, F
(1,31)= 23.5, p < .001, np2= 0.431: participants looked more to the
Question box under the ON setting compared to the OFF setting. There
was also a main eﬀect of Time window, F(2,62)= 122.0, p < .001,
np2= 0.797, and an interaction eﬀect between Setting and Time
window, F(2,62)= 21.3, p < .001, np2= 0.408: participants looked
more to the Question box during the question and post-answer phases,
especially in the ON setting (Fig. 6b,d).
For the Answer box, there was a main eﬀect of Time window, F
(2,62)= 210.7, p < .001, np2= 0.872, but no main eﬀect of Setting or
interaction: participants looked more to the Answer box in the pre-
answer phase (Fig. 6c,d). These results are consistent with the Story
task: gaze moves around the screen according to task demands, and
participants look less to the confederate in the ON setting compared to
the OFF setting.
Overall, these results are consistent with those obtained in the Story
task: gaze moves around the screen according to the task demands, and
participants look less to the video-feed in the ON setting compared to
the OFF setting.
3.5. Relationship between prosocial behaviour and eye gaze
The data above shows that participants changed both their gaze
behaviour and their prosocial choices according to whether they were
being watched or not. Thus, it is useful to know if these two measures of
social behaviour are related to each other on a trial-by-trial basis.
First, we tested if choices are related to previous gaze behaviour
(during the question phase), that is, are people more prosocial when
they look more to the video-feed? For this, we ﬁtted a mixed ANOVA
for each task, with Setting and Gaze (% looking time to Video box
during question phase) as independent variables, Participant as random
factor, and Choice as dependent variable. For the Story task, results
showed that there was no main eﬀect of Setting or Gaze, nor an in-
teraction eﬀect of Setting X Gaze, on prosocial choices (see Table 4a).
For the Oﬀer task, there was no strong evidence for a main eﬀect of
Setting or Gaze (see Table 5a).
Second, we tested if choices are related to gaze behaviour in the
post-answer phase: do participants look to the confederate to see if she
evaluates their choice? For this, we ﬁtted a mixed ANOVA for each task,
with Setting and Choice as independent variables, Participant as
random factor, and Gaze (% looking time to Video box during post-
answer phase) as dependent variable. For the Story task, the proportion
of looking time to the Video box after giving an answer was negatively
predicted by the prosociality of that answer, Beta=−0.106,
t=−2.68, p < .01 (see Table 4b), although there was no interaction
between Setting and Choice. This means that a decrease in the proso-
ciality of the choices was associated with an increase in the proportion
of looking time to the Video box during the post-answer time window,
regardless of belief. For the Oﬀer task we found a main eﬀect of Setting,
Beta=−0.084, t=3.40, p < .01 (see Table 5b): participants looked
more to the Video box under the OFF setting, regardless of the type of
choice.
4. Discussion
The present study aimed to examine audience eﬀects on prosocial
and gaze behaviour, and test whether they can be explained in terms of
reputation mechanisms. More speciﬁcally, we show the following. First,
we show that prosocial behaviour (both disclosure of prosocial ten-
dencies and monetary donations) somewhat increases when it is pos-
sible to signal a good reputation to an observer. We also ﬁnd that the
increase of prosocial behaviour when disclosing prosocial tendencies
Table 2
Descriptives for the proportion of looking time to each box (Story task).
Setting Time window Video box Question box Answer box
ON question M=0.094
SD=0.093
M=0.774
SD=0.068
M=0.045
SD=0.032
pre-answer M=0.010
SD=0.015
M=0.073
SD=0.068
M=0.861
SD=0.096
post-answer M=0.135
SD=0.148
M=0.447
SD=0.153
M=0.306
SD=0.161
OFF question M=0.148
SD=0.082
M=0.713
SD=0.104
M=0.037
SD=0.029
pre-answer M=0.016
SD=0.023
M=0.097
SD=0.077
M=0.816
SD=0.119
post-answer M=0.135
SD=0.117
M=0.472
SD=0.166
M=0.274
SD=0.149
R. Cañigueral and A.F.d.C. Hamilton Acta Psychologica 195 (2019) 50–63
58
positively correlates with social anxiety traits. Second, we extend
ﬁndings from non-communicative studies by showing that gaze sig-
nalling also conforms to a social norm of avoiding staring in commu-
nicative situations. Finally, we ﬁnd that participants look longer to-
wards the confederate after making a non-prosocial choice, but this is
true for both the live and pre-recorded interactions. These ﬁndings also
show that the deceptive video-conference paradigm is an eﬃcient ex-
perimental setting to test audience eﬀects. The implications of these
ﬁndings for social cognitive research are discussed below.
4.1. Reputation management and being watched
Using our novel deceptive video-conference paradigm we ﬁnd
marginal evidence that, both in the Story and Oﬀer tasks, participants
are more likely to act for the beneﬁt of other people (i.e. they choose
more prosocially) when they believe they are being watched than when
they do not hold this belief. This corroborates previous studies showing
that people increase their prosocial behaviour when being watched
(Cage et al., 2013; Emler, 1990; Filiz-Ozbay & Ozbay, 2014; Izuma
et al., 2010, 2009; Izuma et al., 2011; Satow, 1975; Tennie et al., 2010).
Because control and test conditions in our paradigm are tightly matched
(we use the same stimuli across both ON and OFF settings), they diﬀer
only in the belief in being watched. Thus, these ﬁndings indicate that
this change in behaviour may be driven by the need to signal good
reputation in front of an observer (Bradley et al., 2018; Smith & Bird,
2000), rather than by the mere presence of another person. A key ele-
ment in reputation management is that individuals seek to be viewed
positively by others (Cage, 2015; Izuma, 2012), and achieving this is
processed as a social reward (e.g. Izuma et al., 2009; Izuma et al.,
2010). In the context of our tasks, the social reward associated with
making prosocial choices in front of others likely exceeds the individual
temporal or monetary beneﬁts associated with non-prosocial choices.
Although audience eﬀects on prosocial behaviour are marginal in
both tasks, we ﬁnd that they are somewhat stronger in the Story task
than in the Oﬀer task. This suggests that changes in prosocial behaviour
in lab-based studies happen beyond decisions made in economic games
(Cage et al., 2013; Filiz-Ozbay & Ozbay, 2014; Izuma et al., 2011), that
is, even when decisions apply to daily life situations. Given that eco-
nomic games may have poor external validity (Galizzi & Navarro-
Martinez, 2017; Winking & Mizer, 2013), it would be interesting to see
how our ﬁndings generalise to real world contexts. This might be a
promising (and challenging) avenue for future research on audience
eﬀects.
There are several possible reasons why, compared to previous stu-
dies (Cage et al., 2013; Izuma et al., 2011), we ﬁnd only a tendency for
an audience eﬀect in the Oﬀer task. On the one hand, in previous
Fig. 5. Story task. Proportion of looking time for each box, time window and setting: mean (●), SE (error bars), and frequency of values (width of distribution). a)
Video box. b) Question box. c) Answer box. d) Heatmaps showing diﬀerence in proportion of looking time between ON and OFF settings for each box and time
window. Asterisks signify diﬀerence between ON and OFF setting at p < .05 (*), p < .01 (**) and p < .001 (***).
Table 3
Descriptives for the proportion of looking time to each box (Oﬀer task).
Setting Time window Video box Question box Answer box
ON question M=0.117
SD=0.152
M=0.730
SD=0.150
M=0.059
SD=0.043
pre-answer M=0.015
SD=0.021
M=0.217
SD=0.127
M=0.522
SD=0.176
post-answer M=0.165
SD=0.155
M=0.513
SD=0.209
M=0.136
SD=0.108
OFF question M=0.158
SD=0.150
M=0.652
SD=0.160
M=0.057
SD=0.043
pre-answer M=0.027
SD=0.037
M=0.209
SD=0.124
M=0.544
SD=0.206
post-answer M=0.247
SD=0.153
M=0.356
SD=0.177
M=0.147
SD=0.092
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studies participants were given an endowment of around £40 (payment
for attending a full testing day), but in our experiment participants were
given an endowment of only £4: this amount might be too low to make
participants feel they are losing money if they decide to donate it. On
the other hand, in previous studies participants would have a
50–90min break between the two sessions/settings, whereas in our
study there was no break. This could explain the trend towards an eﬀect
of the order in which the settings appeared: doing the task ﬁrst under
the ON setting seemed to have a carryover eﬀect of being watched on
prosocial behaviour in the OFF setting. Finally, our study is somewhat
underpowered to detect eﬀects of being watched on prosocial beha-
viour (see Limitations section below). One way to explore the eﬀec-
tiveness of our method further is to compare the behaviour of the 9
participants who did not believe our manipulation to the 32 who did,
and we report this comparison in detail in the Supplementary Materials
(S7). Brieﬂy, the analysis suggests that believing the manipulation is
critical to obtaining our results.
Interestingly, we ﬁnd that higher social anxiety traits correlate with
greater increase of prosocial behaviour in the Story task when being
observed. These ﬁndings are in line with previous evidence suggesting
that people with social anxiety traits might be more susceptible to au-
dience eﬀects and reputation management. For instance, negative
personality traits (e.g. low self-esteem, neuroticism or introversion,
which are associated with social anxiety) are strong predictors of how
social presence will aﬀect individual performance (Uziel, 2007).
Moreover, it has been shown that the need for social approval has a
positive eﬀect on the amount of money participants donate, particularly
when donations are made in front of an observer (Satow, 1975). Our
exploratory analysis corroborates these studies by showing that people
with social anxiety traits, who have increased concerns to gain social
approval (Cremers & Roelofs, 2016; Morrison & Heimberg, 2013), are
Fig. 6. Oﬀer task. Proportion of looking time for each box, time window and setting: mean (●), SE (error bars), and frequency of values (width of distribution). a)
Video box. b) Question box. c) Answer box. d) Heatmaps showing diﬀerence in proportion of looking time between ON and OFF settings for each box and time
window. Asterisks signify diﬀerence between ON and OFF setting at p < .05 (*), p < .01 (**) and p < .001 (***).
Table 4
Relationship between prosocial behaviour and eye gaze (Story task).
a) Does gaze before the choice predicts
choices?
b) Do choices predict gaze after the
choice?
Setting Beta=−0.013
t(293.8)=−0.243
p > .05
Setting Beta=−0.022
t(288.2)=−0.641
p > .05
GazeBefore Beta=−0.246
t(303.8)=−0.973
p > .05
Choice Beta=−0.106
t(303.8)=−2.68
p < .01⁎⁎
Setting X
GazeBefore
Beta=−0.159
t(302.9)=−0.506
p > .05
Setting X
Choice
Beta=0.031
t(289.6)= 0.586
p > .05
Participant Beta=0.022
Z=2.65
p < .01⁎⁎
Participant Beta=0.009
Z=3.04
p < .01⁎⁎
Table 5
Relationship between prosocial behaviour and eye gaze (Oﬀer task).
a) Does gaze before the choice predicts
choices?
b) Do choices predict gaze after the
choice?
Setting Beta=−0.049
t(1,506.9)=−1.79
p= .074+
Setting Beta=0.084
t(30.5)= 3.40
p < .01⁎⁎
GazeBefore Beta=−0.156
t(1,450.9)=−1.67
p= .09+
Choice Beta=−0.019
t(33.1)=−0.691
p > .05
Setting X
GazeBefore
Beta=0.139
t(1,519.5)= 1.26
p > .05
Setting X
Choice
Beta=0.031
t(289.6)= 0.586
p > .05
Participant Beta=0.033
Z=27.4
p < .001⁎⁎⁎
Participant Beta=0.009
Z=3.04
p < .01⁎⁎
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more likely to change their behaviour (to signal good reputation) when
other people are observing. However, this correlation is not found for
the Oﬀer task. A reason for this could be that economic games, such as
the Dictator game used in the Oﬀer task, have poor external validity
(Galizzi & Navarro-Martinez, 2017; Winking & Mizer, 2013), so changes
in this measure may not be sensitive to real-life behaviours rated in the
social anxiety questionnaire.
4.2. Gaze behaviour and being watched
Gaze behaviour was recorded throughout the Story and Oﬀer tasks
to determine how people use gaze to gain and signal social information
during a communicative interaction. Overall, both tasks show the same
pattern of results. As expected, participants looked more at the Video
and Question boxes when the question was asked, and more at the
Answer box before giving an answer. An interesting pattern emerged
with regard to the comparison between ON and OFF settings. During
the question phase, participants spent less time looking at the Video box
in the ON setting than in the OFF setting, while the opposite was found
for the Question box. The same applied during the post-answer phase,
although this was only true for the Oﬀer task.
According to the dual function model of eye gaze (Gobel et al.,
2015; Risko et al., 2016), these ﬁndings indicate that, when participants
believe they are being watched, they use their gaze to signal to the
other person and not just to acquire information. Averted gaze in live
social interactions has been associated with preference for no interac-
tion (Foulsham et al., 2011) and conformity with social norms (e.g. it is
not polite to stare at someone; Gobel et al., 2015; Gobel et al., 2017;
Laidlaw et al., 2011). Thus, it seems that in a communicative situation,
gaze signalling also conforms to the social norm of avoiding staring,
despite the closer social link between the participant and confederate.
In line with this, the analysis with the group of excluded participants
suggests that this pattern of results is speciﬁc to the group of partici-
pants who believe the manipulation (see S7). However, this ﬁnding
contrasts with a recent study by Mansour and Kuhn (2019), where they
ﬁnd that participants in a communicative situation direct more gaze to
the eyes of the confederate in a live video-call than in a pre-recorded
video-call. A critical diﬀerence is that in their paradigm the confederate
was talking about herself for around 2.5 min in a rather relaxed context,
whereas in our tasks the confederate asked a short question of around
10 s (Story task) or 3 s (Oﬀer task) in a more rigid context. As Mansour
& Kuhn suggest, it could be that diﬀerent social norms of eye gaze apply
to diﬀerent communicative situations: looking to the confederate to
show interest is likely to be the norm when she is sharing personal
information, whereas civil inattention may be the norm for more
structured forms of interaction.
To further understand the meaning of these gaze patterns it is cri-
tical to consider the function of gaze as a social, but also interactive
signal. The claim that gaze patterns change to conform to social norms
provides a useful description of behaviour (Gobel et al., 2015; Gobel
et al., 2017; Laidlaw et al., 2011), but this is not the same as having a
detailed cognitive model of the control of social gaze. Such a model
should integrate temporal and spatial aspects of gaze across diﬀerent
contexts to give a sensible account of eye gaze in real life, but also a
more accurate interpretation of previous studies using photos and vi-
deos. In the following, we show how analysing the relationship between
eye gaze and other behaviours (prosocial choices) can help identifying
social cognitive mechanisms that modulate eye gaze in live interactions.
4.3. Relationship between prosocial and gaze behaviour
To our knowledge, our study is the ﬁrst one to simultaneously
measure prosocial behaviour and eye gaze in a conversation context:
this creates a suitable communicative environment to examine the re-
lationship between prosocial choices and gaze behaviour, and how they
are modulated by the belief in being watched. In our design, we
distinguish between three time windows (question, pre-answer and
post-answer) locked to a key event in the interaction: the participant
making a choice. We consider two diﬀerent hypotheses.
The social attention hypothesis suggests that gaze behaviour at the
start of the trial will predict later choices. For instance, it has been
shown that mutual gaze increases prosocial behaviour of participants
(see Bull & Gibson-Robinson, 1981 for an example). In both the Story
and Oﬀer task, there was no evidence to support this: looks at the start
of the trial did not relate to subsequent choices in either setting. This
suggests that the amount of attention directed to the confederate does
not impact on prosocial decision-making.
The reputation management hypothesis suggests that prosocial
choices will predict gaze behaviour after the choice in the ON setting,
because participants will look at the confederate to seek information
about how they are evaluated (e.g. check if she approves or disapproves
their choices) (Efran, 1968; Efran & Broughton, 1966; Kleinke, 1986).
For the Story task, we ﬁnd that participants looked more to the con-
federate after making a non-prosocial choice than a prosocial choice,
but this is true for both ON and OFF settings. Although this is not en-
tirely consistent with the reputation management hypothesis (the eﬀect
was found in both ON and OFF settings; discussed below), it suggests
that participants were generally worried about what the confederate
would think of them when they made a non-prosocial choice: by gazing
to the confederate, participants could monitor whether she disapproved
their choice, and gave them the chance to re-engage with her again. In
line with this, Nasiopoulos, Risko, and Kingstone (2015) have recently
suggested that participants' gaze may weigh the potential gain of at-
tending to a speciﬁc location with the cost of revealing their attentional
state. In the context of our task, both attending to what the confederate
thinks and revealing that ‘I want to re-engage with her’ are strongly
beneﬁcial to restore reputation after making a non-prosocial choice,
and this might result in more looking to the confederate. Moreover, we
did not ﬁnd this relationship in the group of excluded participants (see
S7), which indicates that the feeling that the confederate can evaluate
their choices fades away once the manipulation is uncovered.
There are two main limitations to this result. First, we could not
replicate this ﬁnding in the Oﬀer task. It could be that participants care
more about reactions to the choices in the Story task because they are
more meaningful to them (i.e. they depict real-life situations).
However, it is necessary that future studies test whether this relation-
ship is also true for other types of prosocial choices. Second, this re-
lationship was not modulated by the belief in being watched: partici-
pants behaved equally in ON and OFF settings. It is not yet clear if this
is because of too much social gaze in the OFF setting (OFF is like ON) or
too little social gaze in the ON setting (ON is like OFF). The former
could arise if there is a default response of acting in a social fashion
whenever we are in front of a social stimulus, and if top-down knowl-
edge that ‘this is not a real person’ is not enough to inhibit the natural
social behaviour. Similar eﬀects are seen when a person gestures even
when talking on the telephone, despite knowing that the other cannot
see them. Alternatively, it could be that our video-conference condition
is not a perfect match for real life, because it is a computer-mediated
interface without true eye contact. Thus, participants might not engage
in social signalling as fully as they would in real life. Further studies
comparing face-to-face interactions with video-conferencing and video
watching conditions will help distinguish between these possibilities.
Overall, our ﬁndings suggest that the belief in being watched has dif-
ferent degree of modulation over prosocial choices and eye gaze, but
that it may not be suﬃcient to fully modulate complex social behaviour
like the relationship between prosocial choices and gaze.
4.4. Limitations
Although these are promising ﬁndings for cognitive research on
audience eﬀects, the design of this study also has some general lim-
itations. First, there is not enough evidence for a strong eﬀect of being
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watched on prosocial behaviour. Post-hoc power analyses with
G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009; Faul, Erdfelder,
Lang, & Buchner, 2007) showed that the study is underpowered to
detect eﬀects of being watched on prosocial behaviour in both tasks
(power ≈ 0.5), but is well powered to detect eﬀects of being watched
on gaze (power≈ 0.9). This could be due to low number of behavioural
trials (5 in the Story task, and 24 in the Oﬀer task), in contrast with the
large number of data-points collected for eye-tracking. Keeping the
number of behavioural trials low was essential to keep the study short
and increase ecological validity (i.e. with too many repetitions it would
be easy to detect that the confederate was always pre-recorded). Future
studies with bigger sample sizes would increase power and yield en-
ough evidence to reliably ﬁnd (or not) an eﬀect of Setting on prosocial
behaviour in both tasks. However, we do not think that ﬁnding strong
eﬀects on prosocial behaviour is fundamental for the rest of the study
(i.e. eye gaze results). The fact that eye gaze (a quick and spontaneous
behaviour) is strongly modulated by Setting, but making prosocial
choices (a strategic decision-making process) shows weaker modula-
tion, suggests that diﬀerent forms of reputation management have
diﬀerent sensitivity to the belief in being watched, at least when using
our deceptive video-conference paradigm.
Second, we ﬁnd that evidence for audience eﬀects on prosocial
behaviour is stronger in the Story task than in the Oﬀer task, also when
testing the relationship with social anxiety traits. Although this could be
due to the diﬀerent nature of the questions asked in each task (dis-
closure of prosocial tendencies in real-life situations, or monetary de-
cisions in an economic game), it is important to consider that partici-
pants always completed the tasks in the same order: Story task followed
by Oﬀer task. Thus, it could be that after completing the Story task
participants feel more relaxed towards the confederate monitoring their
choices, and consequently do not change their prosocial behaviour in
the Oﬀer task. Counterbalancing the order of the tasks would clarify
whether some of these eﬀects are also found when using more artiﬁcial
tasks like economic games.
One last concern is the gaze metric we use, proportion of total
looking time. It has been suggested that this type of metric can chal-
lenge internal validity, because it involves inappropriate aggregation of
gaze data (Orquin & Holmqvist, 2018). For instance, when we ﬁnd that
participants look more to the Video box in the OFF setting, it could be
that there are many short ﬁxations, or that ﬁxations are longer. Thus,
using more precise measures such as number of ﬁxations and ﬁxation
duration can be more informative to accurately interpret gaze data.
4.5. Implications and future research
The present ﬁndings have important implications for social neu-
roscience research. We show that our deceptive video-conference
paradigm is eﬀective in promoting cognitive processes triggered by the
belief in being watched (e.g. reputation management, signalling func-
tion of gaze), while combining high ecological validity and experi-
mental control. Interestingly, we also ﬁnd that under the belief in being
watched the confederate is perceived as more likeable and natural, and
tends to be perceived as more reciprocal: being embedded in a true
interaction and able to communicate with each other modulates how
we behave in front of others, but also has positive consequences on how
we perceive our interactive partners. This is supported by the analyses
with participants who do not believe the deceptive manipulation, since
they perceive both confederates as equally likeable, natural and re-
ciprocal. In light of these results and following advocates for a second-
person neuroscience (Risko et al., 2016; Schilbach et al., 2013), we
encourage researchers to take a more ecologically valid approach when
implementing studies on social cognition, either by having a real in-
teraction or by using alternative approaches, such as this deceptive
video-conference paradigm.
We also provide novel evidence of how relationships between gaze
and other events in the interaction can potentially help identify social
cognitive processes that modulate gaze behaviour. Here, the relation-
ship between prosocial choices and subsequent eye gaze suggests that
reputation management engages a strategic use of gaze to maintain
reputation: the less prosocial choices are, the more participants look to
the confederate to monitor how they are evaluated. This ﬁnding high-
lights the importance of the relationship between gaze and other events
in the interaction (such as whether ‘I am behaving in a prosocial way or
not’) in understanding gaze behaviour in live communicative contexts.
However, future studies should investigate whether this is a sponta-
neous gaze response that is normally inhibited in non-live settings, and
whether face-to-face interactions (where both partners directly see each
other) boost the eﬀects on this relationship. Overall, cognitive models
that explain changes of eye gaze in real life need to incorporate its
dynamic and interactive aspects: this will be key to understand gaze
behaviour in real life, but also to carefully re-interpret previous studies
using photos and videos.
4.6. Conclusion
The present study aimed to advance current knowledge of how
prosocial and gaze behaviour acquire a signalling function when being
watched, and whether this can be explained by reputation management
processes. By using our novel deceptive video-conference manipulation
and a communicative context, we show that under the belief in being
watched participants tend to increase prosocial decisions, and that this
increase correlates with social anxiety traits. We also ﬁnd that when
being watched participants modulate their gaze according to social
norms. This extends previous ﬁndings in non-communicative situations
and indicates that participants change their prosocial and gaze beha-
viour to signal good reputation to others. To our knowledge, we also
show for the ﬁrst time that prosocial choices inﬂuence subsequent gaze
patterns of participants. Overall, these results suggest that reputation
mechanisms modulate both prosocial and gaze behaviour, and indicate
that gaze should be considered as an interactive signal. They also
highlight the need to build up a cognitive model of gaze dynamics in
live interactions.
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